SEC filings and transcripts for GSAMP Trust S3, including financials, news, proxies, indentures, prospectuses, and credit agreements. Commission File Number of issuing entity: GSAMP Trust S3. (Exact name of issuing entity as specified in its Charter). Fraud Audit. Was the risk that Goldman hedged with AIG as bad as Goldman Sachs Alternative Mortgage Products’ GSAMP Trust S3?.

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Alas, almost everyone involved in this duck-feeding deal has had a foul experience. Pmnts, 11 Month Prior. The butcher – excuse us, the investment banker – gives customers what they want. Realized Loss Detail Report. It was go-go finance, very 21st century. These tsamp, which are fixed-rate, carried an average interest rate of Goldman peddled the securities in late April That’s because Goldman, like other assemblers of mortgage-backed deals, doesn’t tell investors who the borrowers are.

Basis Risk CarryFwd Unpaid. The butcher—excuse us, the investment banker—gives customers what they want.

Junk mortgages under the microscope – Oct. 16,

To transform them into securities it could sell to investors, it divided them into tranches – which is French for “slices,” in case you’re interested. You have only the illusion of safety. Tyson can slice a chicken into breasts, legs, thighs, giblets – and Lord knows what else – and get more for the pieces than it gets for a whole chicken. That’s because the models were based on recent performances of junk-mortgage borrowers, who hadn’t defaulted much until last year thanks to the housing bubble.


Any loan losses would first hit the X tranche.

Even Goldman may have lost money on GSAMP – but being Goldman, the firm has more than covered its losses by betting successfully that the price of junk mortgages would drop.

So let’s reduce this macro story to human scale.

GSAMP Trust S3 Credit Rating – Moody’s

Any loan losses would first hit the X tranche. No, that’s not a misprint – the average loan-to-value of the issue’s borrowers was Read the page prospectus, related documents, and other public records with a jaundiced eye and try to rtust how things can go wrong.

More from Fortune Will Mmmhops be a hit?

And no one knows whether borrowers’ incomes or assets bore any serious relationship to what they told the mortgage lenders. B-2, B-1, M-7, and so on. Loss Severity Approximation for Current Period. Reporter Associate Doris Burke contributed to this article. That, of course, is what nearly everyone does. Then, if X were wiped out, the losses would work their way up the food chain tranche by tranche: How is a buyer of securities like these supposed to know how safe they trkst It gets even hinkier.

Someone wants a safe, relatively low-interest, short-term security? Way too late, as usual, regulators and lenders began imposing higher credit standards. Weill doesn’t lay blame on any particular party, although in a Sept.


Average PSA Approximation over period geamp the nth month and mth month: Similarly, Wall Street carves mortgages into tranches because it can get more for the pieces than it would get for whole mortgages. Interest rates on mortgages stopped falling.

Interest rates on mortgages stopped falling. Welcome to Bailout City!

Junk mortgages under the microscope

After paying the people who collected the payments and handled all the other paperwork, the 2060-s3 Trust had ten percentage points left. That spread was supposed to provide a cushion to offset defaults by borrowers.

We say “about” because some of the tranches are floating-rate rather than fixed-rate. A version of this article was originally published in the October 29, issue of Fortune. As a result, the X tranche, both B tranches, and the four bottom M tranches have been wiped out, and M-3 is being chewed up like a frame house with termites. Goldman said it made money 20066-s3 the third quarter by shorting an index of mortgage-backed securities.

But in we hit an inflection point. In any event, it’s impossible for investors to conduct an independent analysis of the borrowers’ credit quality even if they choose to invest the time, money, and effort to do so. Weighted Average Cap Down Current.